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The Impact of Environmental Regulation on the
Structure of the US Hog Industry
Abstract
While some research nds that environmental regulation of hog production reduces
output by small farms, other work nds that large farms downsize to avoid regulation.
None consider the potential size-bias of regulation. We show theoretically that when
size-based regulations are also size-biased, large farms downsize, expand, or do neither
depending on how regulations shift their marginal production cost relative to their
average cost. Empirical testing suggests limited impact on small farms and large farms
downsize because regulations have a negative size-bias. In this context, regulatory
avoidance is simply one of the three outcomes determined by how regulations aect
cost structure.
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1 Introduction
The swine industry in the United States has become highly concentrated: today, about
71,000 hog farms produce roughly the same hog inventory produced by ten times as many
farms thirty years ago, and 2 percent of the farms produce 46 percent of the inventory.1
A signicant feature of the industry is production in large-scale hog connement facilities,
resulting in large volumes of hog manure within small areas. Being an organic source of crop
nutrients, hog manure, if properly managed, can substitute for chemical fertilizers. However,
proper management requires sucient cropland to spread the manure and/or a market to
sell the excess.
Because hog facilities often do not have sucient cropland for proper manure disposal,
and manure is less consistent in quality than synthetic fertilizers, hog producers may revert
to applying manure in excess of agronomic requirements (Sneeringer and Key, 2011). The
result is water pollution and deterioration of soil quality through contamination of water and
soil with excess nitrogen and phosphate, not to mention through manure leaks from waste
storage lagoons. Excess nitrogen and phosphate cause stunted growth in plants as well as
accelerated eutrophication2 of water systems (Ni et al., 2002). Crowded hog production
also aects air quality through odor, which occurs from the hydrogen sulte originating
from anaerobic fermentation of manure. High concentrations of hydrogen sulte are toxic to
human and animal life as they can cause dizziness, irritation of the respiratory tract, nausea,
and headaches (Ni et al., 2002; Sneeringer, 2010). An increase in livestock production has
been found to be associated with an increase in infant mortality (Sneeringer, 2009a). If the
atmosphere is moist, hydrogen sulte can turn into sulfuric acid which can be detrimental
to concrete and metal (Ayoub et al., 2004).
Federal regulation governing management and disposal of the millions of tons of hog
manure produced every year is derived from the Clean Water Act (CWA). Enacted in 1972,
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the CWA amended the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act to shift regulatory oversight
from states to the federal government by requiring the former to adopt a federally-mandated
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program (Environmental
Protection Agency, 2008).3 Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the program empowers the agency to issue permits to facilities applying for permission to
discharge and to do so within the agency's Euent Limitations Guidelines and Standards.
Discharge permits may also be issued by states authorized to implement the CWA. However,
the EPA retains the authority to enforce any violation of state-issued permits. The EPA
also has the power to overrule state decisions on water pollution.
The rst set of regulation based on CWA and specically targeting water pollution from
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) were enacted in 1976, with subsequent
revisions in 2003, 2008, and 2012. Under the 1976 regulation, the requirement for a permit
to discharge was tied to three CAFO size categories: Large CAFOs, Medium CAFOs, and
Small CAFOs.4 All large CAFOs who wanted to discharge had to apply for a NPDES permit.
The same applied to Medium CAFOs but only for some types of discharges. Small CAFOs
were not required to apply for a permit unless designated as a signicant source of pollution.
In 2003, the EPA implemented a rule requiring all CAFOs to apply for a NPDES per-
mit whether they discharged or not, and to adopt a Nutrition Management Plan (NMP)
that spells out site-specic best management practices for adequate storage and appropriate
disposal of manure. The premise of the new rule is that all CAFOs have a potential to
discharge unless determined otherwise by the EPA, in which case a CAFO would be exempt
from applying for the permit. The \potential discharge" rule was successfully challenged in
the courts on the grounds that the CWA granted authority to the EPA to regulate actual,
not potential discharge. In response to the court ruling, the EPA in 2008 required only
CAFOs that discharge or \propose to discharge" to apply for a permit. A CAFO proposes
to discharge if it is \designed, constructed, operated, or maintained such that a discharge
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would occur." (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The 2008 rule was in turn chal-
lenged in court and was not upheld, again because the wording of the CWA is restricted to
actual discharge. As the law stands now, the EPA can only require a permit for CAFOs
that are discharging, along with a requirement to include an NMP with a NPDES permit
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2012).
While the EPA rules must be adopted nationwide, many states have adopted more strin-
gent regulation than the federal standards. For example, the states of North Carolina,
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Kansas have adopted zoning requirements. Another regulation
that varies by state is the required setback between a facility and the nearest residence. The
federal government requires a setback of 1000 feet but the states of Iowa, North Carolina,
Missouri, Illinois, Kansas, and Oklahoma have adopted more stringent setback requirements
of 1875 feet, 2500 feet, 3000 feet, 4000 feet, 1 mile, and 3 miles, respectively. In addition to
regulation required by the federal government, some states require facility design approval;
construction and operation permits; zoning requirements; and hydrogen sulde regulation.
Regulation of hog production varies between states for three reasons. First, the design of
federal water policy laws gives states sucient authority and exibility to design and imple-
ment their own environmental laws. States have the option to provide funding for voluntary
programs to address the environmental needs of local areas. Second, the characteristics of the
nonpoint-source pollution vary by state. For example, states that are more ood-prone are
at a greater risk of contamination when manure is poorly managed. Due to these dierences
states may make dierent judgments when linking observations of particular management
practices associated with conned hog feeding operations to changes in water quality. Third,
there is heterogeneity between the socioeconomic characteristics of dierent hog producing
states. States with higher population densities located close to hog production facilities
may be more likely to impose stringent regulation. It is well known in the environmental
economics literature that when the marginal damage of pollution varies by location it is not
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optimal to have uniform regulation standards. Dierences between states in farming prac-
tices, topography, climate and hydrologic characteristics may require dierent environmental
laws (Sullivan, Vasavada, and Smith, 2000).
The variation in state environmental stringency has been used to examine the eect
of environmental regulation on three aspects of hog industry structure, namely (1) hog
production, (2) farm exit, and (3) regulatory avoidance. Hog production has consistently
been found to decrease with increased environmental stringency (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin,
and Sharp, 2002; Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier, 2005). Metcalfe (2001) reported that
environmental stringency only aected small hog farms (SHFOs) and had no eect on large
hog farms (LHFOs). Of these papers, Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002) and Herath, Weersink,
and Carpentier (2005) do not attempt to separate inventory in small and large hog operations.
Metcalfe (2001) does separate small and large farm inventory but his methodology does not
incorporate the fact that regulation are size-based. Therefore, Metcalfe's results that only
small farms are aected by environmental regulation may be due to the fact that technological
changes that negatively aect SHFOs happen simultaneously with increases in regulatory
stringency. In a study addressing the determinants of exit behavior of SHFOs, and whether
LHFOs are displacing SHFOs in the U.S hog industry, Kuo (2005) found that technological
improvement, unemployment rate, and hog price aect the exit of SHFOs. The study also
reported that state-level policies such as environmental regulation and incumbent LHFOs
have no eect on the exit of SHFOs. In a study of new entrants to the Canadian livestock
industry, Weersink and Eveland (2006) nd no evidence that regulatory stringency aects
the location decision of producers.
Surprisingly, none of the studies related to hog production or farm exit consider the fact
that environmental regulation aecting the hog industry is size-based (see footnote 4). So not
only is there variation in stringency across states, but also variation across size thresholds.
The only study we are aware of that used the two types of variation to relate environmental
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regulation to industry structure is that by Sneeringer and Key (2011). In it, the authors ex-
amine the eects of size-based regulation on industry structure through regulatory avoidance.
Observing that the largest CAFOs (2500 animals or more) face more stringent environmen-
tal regulation and, hence, higher costs of compliance, the authors examined how that aects
industry structure by inducing incumbent large operations to downsize below 2500 animals
or entrants to choose an operation size also below 2500 animals. Using regression disconti-
nuity techniques, Sneeringer and Key (2011) report regulatory avoidance primarily among
entrants.
The ndings by Sneeringer and Key (2011) are insightful and prompt further questions
that motivate in part the analysis in our paper. Granted that size-based environmental
regulation induces "regulatory avoidance" through downsizing, the question is why some
incumbents among large farms do not downsize, or may in fact increase in size, and why
some entrants still enter at sizes that trigger more stringent regulation. Is one to say, in the
latter cases, that size-based regulation also induces "regulatory neutrality or seeking"? What
we show in our paper is that size-based regulation may induce farms to downsize, increase
in size, or not change in size because size-based regulation may not be size-neutral, i.e., they
may induce unequal shifts in marginal cost and average cost of pork production. Specically,
if there are unequal shifts in the marginal and average cost functions, the equilibrium size of
a representative producer will change, with positive (negative) size bias occurring when the
shift in the average cost curve is larger (smaller) than the shift in the marginal cost curve.
Moreover, since regulation-induced entry or exit in the hog industry may aect the price
of hogs through shifts in the supply of hogs, and the shifts, as we show in this paper, hinge on
the direction of the size-bias eect of the regulation, a model linking regulation and industry
structure should account for cost structure, and explain supply, price, and the number of
rms in the long run. Our objective in this paper is to provide such a model. Specically,
we develop a comparative statics model of long-run industry equilibrium in the presence of
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environmental regulation, and test the model predictions using state-level data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the conceptual model;
Section 3 describes the empirical model; Section 4 discusses the data; Section 3 presents the
estimation procedure; Section 6 shows results; and section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Conceptual Model
The starting point of the model is a perfectly competitive hog industry consisting of SHFOs
and LHFOs. Using EPA size thresholds, we designate as SHFOs all CAFOs feeding less
than 2500 head of hogs and as LHFOs all CAFOs feeding 2500 head or more. To account
for EPA size-based regulation, only LHFOs are subject to environmental regulation and, to
account for state-based implementation, we allow environmental stringency to vary by state.
State j consists of nsj identical SHFOs and n
l
j identical LHFOs such that Nj = n
s
j +n
l
j, with
nsj > 0 and n
l
j > 0. By identical, we mean that farms in each size category have the same
cost structure. Ignoring factor prices for now, costs of production for a SHFO are given by
csj = c
s
j(q
s
j ) and for a LHFO by c
l
j = c
l
j(q
l
j; Ej), where q
k
j is the level of hog output for an HFO
of size k in state j and Ej is a measure of environmental stringency, recalling that it only
aects LHFO's cost of production. We introduce Ej as a cost shifter in the same manner as
in Katz and Rosen (1985), Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman (1988), and Sunding (1996).
We model the eect of regulation on the rm and industry, assuming the industry is initially
in a long-run equilibrium. For ease of notation we do not include the j subscript in the
model below but we recognize that the conditions are state-specic depending on the level
of regulation.
The properties of the cost functions are:
1. aclE =
@(cl(ql;E)=ql)
@E
> 0, average production cost of a LHFO is an increasing function of
the stringency of environmental regulation.
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2. mclE = c
l
qE  0, marginal cost of a LHFO is a non-decreasing function of the stringency
of environmental regulation.
3. mckq = c
k
qq > 0, marginal cost is increasing in output for both LHFOs and SHFOs.
The inverse derived demand function facing the industry is given by p = p(Q), where Q =P
j(n
s
jq
s
j +n
l
qq
l
j), is total hog output and p is the hog price. The demand curve is downward
sloping, p0 < 0. Because only the marginal and average cost curves of LHFOs are aected
by environmental regulation, the number of SHFOs, ns, is unaected by environmental
regulation and MCsE = AC
s
E = 0. This, however, does not preclude SHFOs from adjusting
their output level in response to regulation-induced changes in the market equilibrium price
of nished hogs.
Since hog farmers have the choice of selling nished hogs on the spot market, through
contracts, or a combination thereof, we model the supply decision of the representative hog
farm operation (HFO) of size k in a manner similar to that of Buccola (1981). Denoting the
price clause of a contract as the product of a price base Bk adjusted by a price parameter
bk, and the proportion of nished hogs sold under contract by 0 < rk < 1, prots of the
representative HFO of size k are given by:
max
qs
(1  rs)p(Q)qs + rszsqs   cs(qs); (1a)
max
ql
(1  rl)p(Q)ql + rlzlql   cl(ql; E); (1b)
where z = bB. So, for example, under a formula contract B is tied to an observable hog
price in the open market and, under a cost-plus contract, B is the farmer's per unit variable
cost of production and b > 1 is some negotiated factor. Because our focus is on the eect
of environmental regulation, we remain agnostic as to the type of contract and assume a
xed price arrangement that is independent of the stringency of environmental regulation,
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in which case z is constant. We also assume that, although rk, the proportion of nished
hogs sold under contract is not invariant to such factors as market prices, technology, and
risk preferences, it is independent of environmental stringency (Zheng, Vukina, and Shin,
2008).
Dierentiating Equations 1a and 1b with respect to output yields the following rst-order
conditions:
p(Q) = scsqs(q
s)  srszs (2)
and
p(Q) = lclql(q
l; E)  lrlzl (3)
where k = (1  rk) 1.
Our objective is to examine the change in the output of SHFOs and LHFOs, and entry
and exit of LHFOs due regulation-induced shifts in their production cost. In the long-run,
short-run prots or losses will induce LHFOs to enter or exit the industry until prots are
driven to zero.
The zero prot condition for LHFOs is:
l = (1  rl)p(Q)ql + rlzlql   cl(ql; E) = 0; (4)
or equivalently,
p(Q) = l
cl(ql; E)
ql
  lrlzl = acl(ql; E)  lrlzl: (5)
The comparative static eects of changing environmental regulation stringency are deter-
mined by totally dierentiating Equations 2, 3, and 5 with respect to E. Since environ-
mental regulation does not aect the cost of production for small farms (i.e., entry and exit
conditions) we do not perform comparative statics with respect to ns. The result, expressed
in matrix form, is:
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266664
s p0nl p0ql
p0ns l p0ql
p0ns p0nl p0ql
377775
266664
qsE
qlE
nlE
377775 =
266664
0
lmclE
laclE
377775 dE (6)
where s = nsp0   mcsq and l = nlp0   mclq. Denoting the coecient matrix by 
, its
determinant is det(
) = p0qlsmcsq
lmclq < 0.
Solving Equation 6, the eect of environmental regulation on SHFO output, LHFO out-
put, and the number of LHFOs is given by:
@qs
@E
=
laclE
smcsq
> 0 (7)
@ql
@E
=  mc
l
E   aclE
mclq
(8)
@nl
@E
=   1
ql
(nl
@ql
@E
+ ns
@qs
@E
  
laclE
p0
) (9)
Equation 7 is positive by the properties of the cost function, a result that implies that
the higher the stringency of environmental regulation facing LHFOs the higher the output
of SHFOs. All else equal, an upward shift in LHFOs' average cost due to environmental
regulation leads to a higher price of nished hogs in the long-run, leading to more output
by SHFOs. The magnitude of the increase in output may be aected by the proportion of
output contracted. In cases where the proportions for SHFOs and LHFOs are the same,
rs = rl, contracting has no eect on the change in output level of SHFOs. The proportion of
animals sold under contract aects the magnitude of the eect of environmental regulation
on inventory decisions. Any shift therein is only determined by the relative changes in
average and marginal cost of SHFOs and LHFOs, respectively. On the other hand, if rl > rs
(rs > rl), the increase in output from SHFOs induced by more stringent environmental
regulation on LHFOs is greater (smaller) than with equal or no use of contracting.
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The story is not as straightforward for equations 8 and 9 because of the possibility of
regulation-induced farm-size bias. Farm-size bias results when the shift in the marginal cost
curve is dierent from the shift in the average cost curve. This is analogous to the rm-
size bias in technology-induced cost shifts (Perrin, 1997). In the context of our study, a
positive (negative) farm-size bias results when the shift in the average cost curve is larger
(smaller) than the shift in the marginal cost curve. The farm-size bias is neutral when the
marginal-and average cost curves shift by the same magnitude. A positive (negative) size
bias implies that regulation will increase (decrease) the size of a representative LHFO. Any
of these outcomes are possible with environmental regulation. For example, a requirement
for a siting permit will increase the average cost but have little eect on the marginal cost,
leading to a positive size bias. Regulation that causes a representative LHFO to acquire
additional capital to conform to regulation will increase average cost, leading to an increase
in its scale of production. On the other hand, a requirement to reduce the application
rate for manure spreading will have a large eect on the marginal cost curve because land
and transportation costs for manure spreading are higher with increased distance. Thus, a
regulation about manure spreading rates will likely have a negative size bias. In this case, the
size bias of environmental regulation induces a farm to downsize, a decision that may seem
as though a rm is avoiding regulation when in fact it is maximizing prots under conditions
of a negative size bias of the environmental regulation. When there is a positive size bias,
we know from equation 9 that the number of LHFOs will decrease due to environmental
regulation. This result is ambiguous with negative size bias as the increase in output from
SHFOs and ratio of the change in cost to the change in price will reduce the number of large
farms while the decrease in output from LHFOs will have the opposite eect. These results
are summarized in Table 1. In addition, the level of contracting will change the impact of
environmental regulation on the number of LHFOs. Dierentiating equation 9 with respect
to l and s shows that any entry or exit of large farms due to environmental regulation is
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reduced (increased) with contracting by large (small) farms.
<< Insert Table 1 >>
Hence the nature of LHFO technology determines the signs of equations 8 and 9. When
both pre- and post-regulation technologies are homothetic, regulation shifts the total cost
curve without changing its slope at every output level. This results in a shift in the average
cost curve and not the marginal cost curve, which has an unambiguous positive size bias on
large farms. On the other hand, with non-homothetic technology, regulation will shift the
total cost curve at the same time altering its slope at every point. Because regulation will
have an eect on both marginal and average cost curves, there is a possibility for positive
farm-size bias, negative farm-size bias, or no farm-size bias. The most commonly documented
long-run competitive equilibrium supply shift in economics textbooks is the technical change
induced shift, which shifts both long run marginal and average cost curves.5 As explained
earlier, when environmental regulation shifts marginal and average cost curves, it is not
readily apparent whether it shifts the marginal cost curve more or less than the average cost
curve.
<< Insert Figure 1>>
Illustrations of the various possible outcomes are shown in Figure 1. Figure (1a) illustrates
the case where regulation-induced shift in the average cost curve is equal to the shift in
the marginal cost curve. The impact of this shift takes the opposite direction of neutral
technological change on the rm.6 Figure (1b) illustrates the case where regulation-induced
shift in the average cost curve is greater than the shift in the marginal cost curve. Regulation
causes marginal and average cost curves to shift from MC to MC3 and from AC to AC3,
respectively. The resulting eect would be to increase the long-run equilibrium output of
an individual HFO from q to q3, implying positive farm-size bias, and to increase the long-
run equilibrium price faced by the individual HFO from p to p3. This result implies that
regulation has a positive eect on an individual HFO's output. Lastly, in the case when
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marginal cost shifts upward more than average cost, output decreases from q to q4. In this
case, regulation will decrease HFO output. This case is shown in Figure (1c). In either case,
however, price is higher in the long-run, inducing unregulated farms to increase output, as
was shown by equation 7.
To determine the eect of environmental regulation on industry output, we rst dier-
entiate the equilibrium industry output Q = nsqs + nlql with respect E and make use of
equation (9). The yields
@Q
@E
=
laclE
p0
< 0; (10)
which implies
@p
@E
= laclE > 0; (11)
What transpires from our conceptual model is that while a SHFO's output increases
with higher stringency of environmental regulation, the output and number of LHFOs may
either increase or decrease with environmental regulation depending on the associated shifts
in the marginal and average cost curves. However, in the long-run, regulation increases the
hog price and decreases total industry output. These results are similar to the ndings by
Lahiri and Ono (2007) who studied the eects of an emission tax on price and output in a
symmetric oligopoly - an emissions tax leads to a decrease in aggregate output but has an
ambiguous eect on output per rm.
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3 Empirical Model
For empirical implementation, we rst augment the cost function with factor prices. So costs
for hog farms of size k, for k = s; l, located in state j, at time t, are re-written as
ckjt = c
k
t (q
k
jt; wcjt; wdjt; Ejt); (12)
where qk is output, wc price of corn (the major feed), wd, the price of transportation, and
E is environmental stringency. It follows that the optimality conditions 2, 3, and 5 can be
re-written as:
pjt = 
s
jtmc
s
jt(q
s
jt; wcjt; wdjt)  sjtrsjtzsjt (13)
pjt = 
l
jtmc
l
jt(q
l
jt; wcjt; wdjt; Ejt)  ljtrljtzljt (14)
and
pjt = 
l
jtac
l
jt(q
l
jt; wcjt; wdjt; Ejt)  (rz)ljt (15)
Simultaneous solution of 13, 14, and 15 yields, in general form, the equilibrium quantities
supplied by SHFOs and LHFOs, respectively, and the equilibrium number of LHFOs:
qsjt = q
s
jt(pjt; wcjt; wdjt; r
s
jt; r
l
jt; Ejt) (16)
qljt = q
l
jt(pjt; wcjt; wdjt; r
l
jt; r
s
jt; Ejt) (17)
nljt = n
l
jt(pjt; wcjt; wdjt; r
l
jt; r
s
jt; Ejt) (18)
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Second, we assume the respective estimating equations of 16-18 to take the linear forms:
ln qsjt = 
s
o + 
s
p ln pjt + 
s
c lnwcjt + 
s
d lnwdjt + 
s
srr
s
jt + 
s
lrr
l
jt + 
s
eEjt
+
K 1X
j
sjDD
s
j + 
s
tT + 
s
jt; (19)
ln qljt = 
l
o + 
l
p ln pjt + 
l
c lnwcjt + 
l
d lnwdjt + 
l
srr
s
jt + 
l
lrr
l
jt + 
l
eEjt
+
K 1X
j
ljDD
s
j + 
l
tT + 
l
jt; (20)
and
lnnsjt = 
n
o + 
n
p ln pjt + 
n
c lnwcjt + 
n
d lnwdjt + 
n
srr
s
jt + 
n
lrr
l
jt + 
n
eEjt
+
K 1X
j
njDD
s
j + 
n
t T + 
n
jt: (21)
The variables Dj and T represent state-level xed eects and the state of hog production
technology, respectively. Random disturbance terms are denoted by . Our initial estimation
assumes that the impact of more stringent environmental regulation is equal across all states
(i.e., shifts in marginal and average costs are equal for dierent states that have the same
regulation) but we recognize that there may be dierences across states. As stated in the in-
troductory section, although the EPA sets federal standards for regulation, authorized states
can set their own with some states setting more stringent regulation than others because
of pressure from environmental groups. In addition, each state has the ability to determine
the level of enforcement through higher or lower levels of monitoring. Therefore, states may
dier in enforcement and monitoring despite identical regulation codes for CAFOS.
To capture dierences among states in regulation, enforcement, monitoring, and compli-
ance, we add the interaction between state-level xed eects and environmental regulation
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and rewrite Equations 19 - 21 as Equations 22 - 24:
ln qsjt = 
s
o + 
s
p ln pjt + 
s
c lnwcjt + 
s
d lnwdjt + 
s
sr ln r
s
jt + 
s
lr ln r
l
jt + 
s
e lnEjt
+
K 1X
j
sjDD
s
j +
K 1X
j
sjDEDj lnEjt + 
s
tT + 
s
jt; (22)
ln qljt = 
l
o + 
l
p ln pjt + 
l
c lnwcjt + 
l
d lnwdjt + 
l
sr ln r
s
jt + 
l
lr ln r
l
jt + 
l
e lnEjt
+
K 1X
j
ljDD
s
j +
K 1X
j
ljDEDj lnEjt + 
l
tT + 
l
jt; (23)
and
lnnsjt = 
n
o + 
n
p ln pjt + 
n
c lnwcjt + 
n
d lnwdjt + 
n
sr ln r
s
jt + 
n
lr ln r
l
jt + 
n
e lnEjt
+
K 1X
j
njDD
s
j +
K 1X
j
njDEDj lnEjt + 
n
t T + 
n
jt: (24)
Based on size thresholds set by EPA (see footnote 2), all farms having less than 2500 head
are designated as small and farms having 2500 or more as large. However, as we discuss in
more detail in the data section, given the size thresholds used by the USDA, the main source
of data for the hog industry, we use 2000 head as the threshold to categorize operations into
small and large. While this will lead to some inventory in our sample attributed to the LHFO
category that is not subject to regulation, this will not bias the results on the inventory levels
if operation size is continuously distributed. For the estimation of the number of LHFOs,
the threshold of 2000 head will bias downward any results we nd on entry and exit of
LHFOs. Thus, if we nd an eect on the number of LHFOs, the actual eect will be of
greater magnitude than our estimate.
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4 Data
For data we focus on the top ten hog producing states for the years 1994 through 2006. The
ten states are, in the order of their shares in U.S. hog inventory (slaughter hogs and breeding
hogs), are Iowa (IA), North Carolina (NC), Minnesota (MN), Illinois (IL), Nebraska (NE),
Indiana (IN), Missouri (MO), Oklahoma (OK), Ohio (OH), and Kansas (KS). Together, they
account for 85 percent of the inventory, of which more than ninety percent of is slaughter
hogs. USDA uses nine size categories in reporting the inventory: 1-24, 24-49, 100-199, 200-
499, 500-999, 1000-1,999, 2,000-4,999, and 5000 or more. Because the 2500 EPA threshold
falls in the middle of the USDA 2,000-4,999 category, we designate hog farms with less than
2000 head as SHFOs and hog farms 2000 head or more as LHFOs. Hence, output for each of
the two size categories is equal to the total inventory in the 1-1,999 size categories for SHFOs
and to the total inventory in the 2000 or more category for LHFOs. There has been a shift
over time in the overall structure of the hog industry with a reduction in total farms and an
increase in the average size of each farm. The total inventory in large farms has increased
over time Kuo (2005).7 Table 2 shows some of the state-level shifts in the industry during
the sample period. While the percentages vary by state, all ten of the top hog-producing
states have seen a decrease in SHFO inventory and an increase in LHFO inventory. The
use of contracting has also increased over time in both small and large farms. While the
proportion varies by state (e.g., the majority of hogs sold in North Carolina are sold through
contracts while less than 20 percent of hogs in Nebraska are contracted), the general trend
of an increase in contracting is consistent across all states.
With the exception of the data on environmental stringency and contracts, which we
discuss shortly in more detail, the rest of the variables used to estimate equations 19, 20,
and 21 are all from secondary sources. The list of all variables and their denitions is as
follows:
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qsjt = SHFO hog inventory (total hog inventory owned by operations of size less than 2000
head).
qsjt = LHFO hog inventory (total hog inventory owned by operations of size 2000 head or
more).
nljt = Number of LHFOs (size 2000 head or more).
pjt= Hog price ($/hundredweight).
wcjt= Corn price ($/bushel).
wdjt= Gasoline price (cents/gallon).
rsjt = SHFO contracts (percent of inventory).
rljt = LHFO contracts (percent of inventory).
Ejt = Environmental stringency.
The summary statistics for all of these variables except for environmental stringency is
in Table 3. The rst four variables on the list (qsjt, q
s
jt, n
l
jt, pjt, and wcjt) were all taken from
United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service Quickstats
website.8 We note that the variables on hog inventory are all at the aggregate state level, and
cannot be interpreted as the size of any particular hog farm. However, based on the average
numbers we know that the mean LHFO inventory is approximately 6000 head. The variable
wdjt was taken from the website of the Energy Information Agency.
9 Hogs under production
contracts by size category (rsjt and r
l
jt) are available by state only for the census years 2002
and 2007. To generate observations for noncensus years, we use the percent growth rate in
contracts between 2002 and 2007 to backcast between the years 1999 and 2001 and forecast
for the years between 2003 and 2006.
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<< Insert Table 3 >>
The data series for the environmental stringency variable (Ejt ) are a combination of three
subsamples, two of which are from secondary sources and is shown in Table 4. For each state,
we make use of a 1994-2006 time series qualitative environmental stringency data. Several
studies have used qualitative environmental stringency indices to study regulation issues in
the U.S hog industry (Metcalfe, 2000, 2001; Roe, Irwin, and Sharp, 2002; Herath, Weersink,
and Carpentier, 2005). However, with the exception of Metcalfe (2000) these papers have
not attempted to create panel variables for environmental stringency; each has used dierent
cross sections. We directly use the measures from Metcalfe (2000) for the 1994-1997 and
1998-1999 periods. A detailed explanation of the methodology is explained in Appendix
1. Specically, we examine legislation from each state to determine if certain categories
of regulation existed in each of the benchmark years (2000 and 2003). We categorize each
category as `0' for no regulation, `1' for existing regulation, and `2' for extensive regulation in
each category. For example, the minimum federal setback for manure disposal near a stream
is 100 feet, but many states have a more stringent requirement. We use the level of regulation
existing at the beginning of each period, thus regulation in the year 2000 is considered as the
measure for the 2000-2002 period and regulation in the year 2003 is considered the measure
for the 2003-2006 period. 10 The environmental stringency variable is an index of state-level
environmental regulation on HFOs.
<< Insert Table 4 >>
5 Estimation Procedure
The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the eect of environmental strin-
gency on the structure of the hog industry. Equations 19 - 21 show the form of the estimating
equations for hog supply by SHFOs and LHFOs and the number of LHFOs. Of critical impor-
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tance in the estimation is the variation over time and over states in environmental regulation.
We use a two-stage estimation procedure. In the rst stage, we instrument the state-specic
hog prices and environmental stringency. In the second stage, we use the predicted values
of the instrumented variables and estimate the three equations using seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR).
Our rationale for treating hog prices and environmental stringency as endogenous vari-
ables is as follows. First, for a given demand schedule for hogs, the output price of hogs
is likely to be simultaneously determined with hog supply. The environmental stringency
variable may also be endogenous because states may respond to increased hog production
by adjusting regulation. The endogeneity of environmental compliance costs was rst noted
by Metcalfe (2001) and later considered by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005). To
nd valid instruments for the environmental stringency variables we use a similar analysis
as Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Levinson (2003) who estimate a reaction function
for state level environmental regulation by using data from other states. The idea behind
the reaction functions is that states may calibrate the regulation stringency in response to
neighboring states to position themselves as hog friendly or un-friendly states. There are a
couple of ways that surrounding states aect the level of environmental stringency in the
target state. First, some of the literature has argued that there is a "race to the bottom",
where states compete to be seen as business friendly by lowering environmental standards
to attract businesses. While this has not been found to be the case in a previous study of
livestock operations Weersink and Eveland (2006), we recognize that this is one method that
policy decisions in the surrounding states aect decisions in the target state. On the other
hand, states may increase environmental stringency in response to changes in a surrounding
state due to political pressure from environmental groups. We also use the League of Conser-
vation Voters (LCV) Congressional score as an additional instrument.11 The LCV score has
been used in other papers to measure the general attitude of a state toward environmental
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protection (Levinson, 2001; Harllee, Kim, and Nieswiadomy, 2009).
We estimate reaction functions for each of the states based on the following equation,
where i 6= j are the two highest producing adjacent states to state j:12
ln(Ejt) = LCV j ln(LCVjt) +
X
i6=j
i lnEit + j (25)
<< Insert Table 5 >>
<< Insert Figure 2 >>
We estimate Equation 25 separately for each state. The results of the estimation are
in Table 5. The results show that adjacent states are strong predictors of another state's
level of regulation. Of the 20 state variables, 11 are statistically signicant and 8 of those
11 are positive. This shows that states do tend to react to changes in regulation from other
states, and in most cases the reaction is positively correlated, showing little evidence of a
"race to the bottom". Figure 2 compares the actual and predicted values of environmental
stringency. From this we see that while there is some variation in the predicted values at
each level, the overall t of the instruments for environmental stringency is quite good. We
use the lagged prices for hogs and corn (phjt 1 and pcjt 1) and the current price for beef
(pbjt) as instruments for the current hog price:
ln phjt = h ln phjt 1 + c ln pcjt 1 + b ln pbjt +  (26)
Table 6 shows the results of the instrument estimation. We nd that both the lagged
corn and hog price are strong predictors for the current hog price instrument.
<< Insert Table 6 >>
We use the predicted values from Equation 26 and the J sets of predicted values from
Equation 25 and estimate the inventory and the number of farms (Equations 19 - 21) for our
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second-stage SUR estimation. We test the need for instrumental variables by utilizing the
regression form of the Hausman-Wu test separately on each of the three primary equations
of the econometric model. We nd that test statistic for the endogeneity of hog price is sta-
tistically signicant in all three equations and the test statistic for environmental stringency
is signicant in the supply of LHFO equation.
Because of the two-stage estimation, we adopted the following procedure for second-
stage standard error correction. Let VSUR be the variance-covariance matrix from the SUR
estimation of Equations 19 - 21 (we refer to each of these as Equation m where m = 1; 2; 3)
and let V1, V2, and V3 be the portion of V that corresponds to the variance-covariance matrix
from the estimation of Equation m. Specically,

VSUR

=
266664
V1 V12 V13
V21 V2 V23
V31 V32 V3
377775
We calculate the ratio of the mean-squared errors from the estimates that use the actual
values and the estimates that use the predicted instrumental variables. Specically, denoting
ym as the dependent variable for Equation m, dfm is the degrees of freedom from Equation
m, ^m as the estimated coecients from the SUR estimation, Xm as the actual explanatory
variables, and X^m as the predicted instruments for Xm, we calculate the following for each
equation:
MSEm = (
1
N
X
(ym  X 0m^m)2)=dfm
By denition, the ^MSEm calculated from the SUR estimation is:
dMSEm = ( 1
N
X
(ym   X^ 0m^m)2)=dfm
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Using these results we calculate the corrected variance-covariance matrix for Equation m as:
V adjm =
MSEmdMSEmVm (27)
The corrected standard errors are listed in Table 7 and are also used to estimate the
standard errors for the marginal eects listed in Table 8. << Insert Table 7 >>
6 Results
The results from the SUR estimation of Equations 19 - 24 are in Table 7. The standard
errors from Equation 27 are used to measure the statistical signicance of the coecient
estimates. Examining rst the coecients associated with prices, we nd that most are not
statistically signicant. The price of hogs is only signicant in the output of SHFOs. The
price of corn is signicant and had a positive sign for SHFO inventories and a negative sign
for LHFO inventories and the number of LHFOS. Lack of statistical signicance may be
explained by presence of hog contracts because they may decouple hog supply from output
and factor prices. Hog supply by independent hog farmers (those who do not contract) may
still respond to market prices but, to the extent that the output share of independent hog
producers has declined over time, as shown in Table 2, their contribution to overall supply
response has also declined.
The eect of SHFO and LHFO contracts on hog supply by both types of farms and the
number of LHFOs have some of the expected signs (positive coecients for LHFO contracts
on LHFO output and the number of LHFOs), showing that contracts do aect industry
structure. The number of SHFO contracts has a negative eect on SHFO output, possibly
due to the fact that the role of contracts for small producers is to assure a market for output
rather than increase it as implied by the structure of our model, i.e., contracts, by oering a
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premium over the market price, lead to more quantities supplied. The coecients of the time
variable conrm that the change in the state of technology has moved the industry towards
large scale production. This is consistent with observed trends that the number of livestock
operations in the United States has been decreasing and the average size of each operation is
increasing in the past several decades. The coecients of the state indicator variables show
the magnitude of the dependent variables relative to Iowa, the largest hog producing state in
the country. Not surprisingly most of these values are statistically signicant and negative
since all produce fewer hogs than Iowa.
Of particular interest are the results associated with the environmental stringency (ES).
The theoretical eects of ES are captured by the comparative statics predictions shown
in Equations 7 - 9. With respect to Equation 7, which shows the eect of environmental
stringency on SHFO supply, the predicted change is positive but the magnitude hinges on
response of LHFO average production cost to increased ES. With respect to Equation 8,
which captures the eect on LHFO supply, the predicted change hinges on the response
of LHFO average production cost relative to the response to LHFO marginal production
cost. The direction of change of the number of LHFOs (Equation 9) is determined by the
interaction between market demand and regulation-induced industry supply.
When we examine the SUR results without the interaction terms (the rst three columns
of Table 7) we nd that environmental stringency has a positive but insignicant eect on
SHFO inventory and a negative and statistically signicant eect on LHFO inventory and the
number of LHFOs. It is not that surprising that environmental stringency is not signicant in
the SHFO inventory estimation since any impact is due to a shift in the long-run equilibrium
because of higher pork prices. As environmental stringency continued to change during our
sample period it is possible that SHFOs have not fully adjusted to higher overall prices.
The negative impact of environmental stringency on LHFO inventory is consistent with a
negative size bias. The nal result also shows that environmental stringency has a negative
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eect on the number of LHFOs. Examining Equation 9 shows that this result is consistent
with some increase in production from SHFOs, an increase in contracting for LHFOs, and a
shift in the average cost function of LHFOs.
Due to dierences in state-level enforcement we want to estimate if the impact of in-
creased environmental stringency diers by state. The left three columns of Table 7 show
the estimation results with interaction terms for each state.13 We nd that the coecient on
environmental stringency is positive and signicant for all three equations. As stand-alone
coecients, these are dicult to interpret due to the state-level eects of increased environ-
mental stringency. With the interaction variables the most signicant is the eect on LHFO
inventory, with 7 of the 9 coecients negative and signicant. The magnitude of the coef-
cient is larger for most of the interaction eects than for the EnvironmentalStringency
variable, but we need to estimate the marginal eects to determine if the combined eect
is signicant. The coecients on the interaction variables in the estimation of the number
of LHFOs are negative and signicant for 5 of the 9 states. While 5 of the coecients on
SHFO inventory are signicant, the sign of the coecients varies. This is consistent with the
general results that show an overall decrease in LHFO inventory and the number of LHFOs,
but this also shows that the eects are not consistent across states. In particular, the eects
of environmental stringency stand out in North Carolina, Nebraska, Illinois, and Indiana.
Increased stringency in North Carolina has had a signicant negative eect on the LHFO
inventory and numbers. This is consistent with a previous study that focused specically on
North Carolina's hog industry (Sneeringer, 2009b).
<< Insert Table 8 >>
The state-specic marginal eects of environmental stringency in Table 8. Signwise,
the direction of change of small-farm hog supply is consistent with comparative statics pre-
dictions for all states except Missouri, Nebraska, and North Carolina. While most of the
marginal eects are not statistically dierent from zero, we use a joint test of the magnitudes
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of the estimated coecients. Of the estimates, 7 of 9 are positive in the SHFO inventory
estimation and 7 of 9 are negative in the LHFO inventory estimation. We use a chi-squared
to determine if the distribution of coecients is random and we nd statistical signicance
that the overall eect of environmental stringency is positive for SHFO output and negative
for LHFO output. The marginal eect of environmental stringency on the number of LHFOs
is negative in 6 of 9 states. While this is not statistically signicant, the direction is the
same as in the estimation without interaction terms. When we examine the eects for the
individual states, we nd some interesting results. For example, Minnesota has a positive
marginal eect in all three categories. This is likely due to the fact that Minnesota has
had more stringent environmental regulations than federal standards and most of the other
states for the entire sample period and has still had considerable growth in hog production
(see Table 2). Thus, farms in Minnesota had already altered practices due to stringent
environmental regulation at the beginning of the sample period. Most of the other states
show the same trend as the overall result, that environmental stringency has a positive or no
eect on SHFO output and a negative eect on LHFO output and the number of LHFOs.
These results provide evidence that the technology embodied in environmental regulation
has a negative size bias on LHFOs, aecting their marginal cost of production more than
their average cost of production. This could be due to regulation such as additional record
keeping or to increasing marginal costs associated with manure disposal. As shown in our
results in Table 1, the eect of negative size bias on the number of LHFOs is complicated,
which may be why we are unable to determine the sign of the impact. While the industry
level eects are signicant, the data is not suciently detailed to estimate state-level trends
and impacts of environmental regulation.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we develop a comparative statics model of long-run industry equilibrium in
the presence of environmental regulation and apply the model to the U.S. hog industry. As
part of the Clean Water Act, the environmental regulation facing the hog industry sets the
rules for the management and disposal of the millions of tons of hog manure produced from
conned hog operations. Because the regulation is size-based, with hog operations feeding
2500 head of hogs or more facing more stringent rules than operations feeding less 2500
head, some suspect that it induces regulatory avoidance, with incumbent farms downsizing
or entrants choosing a output levels that are exempt of regulation. However, since there are
farms in the industry that still operate at output levels above 2500 head, what may appear to
be regulatory avoidance could be strictly an outcome of how environmental regulation aects
the cost structure of farms. In contrast to most of the previous literature14 we incorporate
the fact that environmental regulation is not applied to all farms regardless of size and, unlike
Sneeringer and Key's work, we provide an explicit structural model that links environmental
regulation to industry structure. Our economic model shows that with size-based regulation
we should unambiguously observe an increase in output from SHFOs but that the impact
on output and number of LHFOs depends on the size bias embodied in the technology and
practices embodied in environmental regulation.
While we nd little evidence of dierences between states in the eect of environmental
regulation, we do nd evidence that such regulation has decreased LHFO inventory and the
number of LHFOs. This result shows that industry shifts to fewer large livestock farms
have been in spite of, not because of, environmental regulation. The ndings in our paper
are relevant to understanding the impact of regulation on the structure of an industry un-
dergoing high rates of technological change. For regulators who are concerned about both
environmental quality and the protection of small family farms, environmental regulation
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does not seem to adversely aect the viability of such operations. While the results of our
paper provide useful evidence of the impact of regulation more research is needed. We use
an index of environmental stringency that does not account for the dierences in cost asso-
ciated with various practices. Further investigation of this is left for future work. Also, it
is well-known that the enforcement of existing regulation varies by state and our empirical
analysis is unable to explicitly take those dierences into account. Accounting for this is a
dicult but necessary step to better understanding the eect of environmental regulation
on industry structure.
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Table A-1: State Regulation on Hog Animal Feeding Operations: 2003-2006
STATE LC FDA WSA GT PN SETS NMP MSTN BOND MORA CSP TOTAL
GA 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 10
IL 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 9
IN 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 9
IA 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 10
KS 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 11
MN 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 11
MO 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 9
NE 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 9
NC 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 1 10
OH 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 8
OK 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10
PA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8
SD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8
VA 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
Source: State level information from various state agencies.
Appendix 1: Construction of Environmental Stringency Indices
Table A-1 shows how we constructed the environmental stringency indices for the 2000-
2002 and 2003-2006 periods. We follow the methodology used by Metcalfe (2000) so that our
stringency indices are consistent with the values calculated by Metcalfe. The index uses the
following categories of regulation: local control (LC), facility design approval (FDA), waste
system approval (WSA), geologic testing (GT), public notice (PN), setbacks (SETS), nutri-
ent management plan (NMP), a more stringent than NPDES indicator (MSTN), bonding
(BOND) and moratoria (MORA). Following Metcalfe, information on cost-share programs
(CSP) is collected for each state but is not included in the calculation of the index. A `0'
indicates that the type of regulation is not used at the state level; a `1' indicates that the
type of regulation is enforced at the state-level; and a `2' indicates that the regulation is
extensive (signicantly stringent) at the state level. For example, while the federal location
setback requirement (SETS) is 1000 feet, the individual state requirements range from 1875
feet (IA) to three miles (OK). The federal government requires a manure application setback
of 100 feet to 300 feet, while state-required setbacks ranging from 500 feet (IN and OK) to
3960 feet (IL). The environmental stringency index for a state is the sum of the indicators
for each category.
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Table 1: Eect of Environmental Regulation Size-Bias on Industry Structure
Industry characteristic Positive bias Neutral bias Negative bias
Small farm supply + + +
Large farm supply + 0 -
Number of large farms - - + if jnl @ql
@E
j > ns @qs
@E
  laclE
p0
- if jnl @ql
@E
j < ns @qs
@E
  laclE
p0
In the table +, 0, and - denote positive, zero, and negative impacts on the specied
variable.
Table 2: Hog Industry Trends
Small Farm Inventory Large Farm Inventory
(thousands) (thousands)
State 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Illinois 3,072 1,619 1,120 1,728 2,532 2,880
Indiana 2,280 1,307 845 1,720 2,044 2,405
Iowa 9,653 5,738 4,017 3,848 9,362 12,583
Kansas 728 289 252 572 1,231 1,548
Minnesota 3,069 1,914 1,518 1,881 3,886 5,082
Missouri 1,775 537 351 1,775 2,364 2,349
Nebraska 2,815 1,190 870 1,235 1,861 2,030
N. Carolina 820 400 294 7,380 8,900 9,506
Ohio 1,458 924 725 342 566 835
Oklahoma 195 150 142 805 2,160 2,228
Contracts: Small Farms Contracts: Large Farms
State 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Illinois 0.106 0.154 0.202 0.196 0.224 0.251
Indiana 0.332 0.297 0.261 0.128 0.204 0.280
Iowa 0.172 0.259 0.347 0.303 0.351 0.399
Kansas 0.010 0.093 0.187 0.010 0.268 0.346
Minnesota 0.290 0.308 0.325 0.369 0.351 0.332
Missouri 0.095 0.139 0.182 0.174 0.255 0.337
Nebraska 0.107 0.163 0.219 0.007 0.061 0.115
N. Carolina 0.566 0.690 0.814 0.667 0.694 0.720
Ohio 0.250 0.297 0.345 0.223 0.342 0.461
Oklahoma 0.574 0.582 0.590 0.026 0.080 0.135
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Exogenous Variables
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
Small farm hog inventory (qsjt) 1,621,057 1,849,437 128,150 11,020,000
Large farm hog inventory (qsjt ) 3,356,642 3,141,277 252,000 13,303,700
Number of large farms (pjt) 558.4 539.9 30 2270
Hog price (pjt) 41.95 7.37 27.4 55.4
Corn price (wcjt) 2.37 0.471 1.6 3.7
Gasoline price (wdjt) 101.2 31.7 59.8 179.7
Small farm contracts as % percent of inventory ( rsjt) 0.298 0.192 0.01 0.839
Large farm contracts as % percent of inventory ( rljt) 0.281 0.178 0.007 0.725
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Table 4: Variation over Years and between States in CAFO Environmental Stringency
State 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Illinois 2 2 2 2 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Indiana 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 9 9 9 9
Iowa 4 4 4 4 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Kansas 4 4 4 4 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11
Minnesota 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11
Missouri 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 9
Nebraska 3 3 3 3 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 9
North Carolina 1 1 1 1 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Ohio 5 5 5 5 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Oklahoma 4 4 4 4 6 6 9 9 9 10 10 10 10
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Table 6: Estimation of Hog Price Instruments (log)
Coecient T-Statistic
Constant -0.194 -0.60
Lagged Hog Price (log) 0.133** 2.43
Lagged Corn Price (log) 0.403*** 6.36
Beef Price (log) -0.002 -1.42
R-squared 0.6779
All prices in 2004 dollars. Signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels denoted by ***,
**, and * respectively. The other exogenous variables included in the nal estimation are
included for consistency but coecients are not reported for brevity.
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Table 7: Estimation of Hog Industry Model
SHFO LHFO LHFO SHFO LHFO LHFO
Output (log) Output (log) Numbers (log) Output (log) Output (log) Numbers (log)
Constant 14.303*** 18.272*** 9.735*** 13.706*** 16.988*** 8.478***
0.488 0.512 0.487 0.571 0.543 0.487
Hog Price 0.242 -0.045 -0.291 0.352* -0.085 -0.236
(log) 0.219 0.230 0.219 0.189 0.180 0.161
Corn Price 0.271*** -0.195** -0.279*** 0.295*** -0.169** -0.215***
(log) 0.094 0.098 0.093 0.076 0.072 0.065
Transportation Price 0.044 -0.457** -0.255 0.033 -0.373*** -0.214*
(log) 0.181 0.190 0.181 0.146 0.138 0.124
Small Farm -0.278*** 0.036 -0.066 -0.155 -0.080 -0.226**
Contracts (log) 0.054 0.057 0.054 0.129 0.123 0.110
Large Farm 0.061 0.073* -0.047 0.002 0.176*** 0.090**
Contracts (log) 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.048 0.045 0.041
Environmental 0.042 -0.162*** -0.196*** 0.245** 0.340*** 0.199**
Stringency (log) 0.048 0.050 0.048 0.120 0.114 0.102
Time -0.072*** 0.086*** 0.069*** -0.086*** 0.081*** 0.059***
0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011
Illinois -1.311*** -1.194*** -1.205*** -0.947*** -0.246 -0.551***
0.066 0.070 0.066 0.209 0.199 0.178
Indiana -1.272*** -1.414*** -1.378*** -1.751*** 0.810** 0.635*
0.068 0.072 0.068 0.414 0.393 0.352
Kansas -3.092*** -1.922*** -2.781*** -2.906*** -1.142** -2.338***
0.089 0.093 0.088 0.572 0.544 0.488
Minnesota -0.993*** -0.829*** -0.705*** -2.489*** -2.022** -1.853**
0.064 0.067 0.063 0.859 0.817 0.732
Missouri -2.261*** -1.272*** -1.889*** 0.434 1.498*** -1.771***
0.068 0.071 0.068 0.517 0.492 0.441
Nebraska -1.411*** -1.472*** -1.950*** -0.947*** 0.263 -0.512**
0.092 0.097 0.092 0.299 0.285 0.255
N. Carolina -2.322*** -0.095 -0.254*** -1.999*** 0.955*** 0.464**
0.082 0.086 0.082 0.260 0.248 0.222
Ohio -1.765*** -2.713*** -2.403*** -2.703*** -1.976*** -2.858***
0.062 0.065 0.062 0.427 0.406 0.364
Oklahoma -3.287*** -1.563*** -3.164*** -4.215*** -0.814* -2.190***
0.114 0.119 0.114 0.476 0.453 0.406
Illinois x ES -0.160 -0.478*** -0.332***
0.102 0.097 0.087
Indiana x ES 0.259 -1.138*** -1.020***
0.207 0.197 0.176
Kansas x ES -0.032 -0.430** -0.280
0.216 0.205 0.184
Minnesota x ES 0.640* 0.496 0.490
0.378 0.360 0.323
Missouri x ES -1.316*** -1.399*** -0.086
0.255 0.242 0.217
Nebraska x ES -0.271** -0.822*** -0.642***
0.133 0.126 0.113
N. Carolina x ES -0.208** -0.500*** -0.313***
0.104 0.099 0.089
Ohio x ES 0.485** -0.348* 0.272
0.215 0.205 0.184
Oklahoma x ES 0.388** -0.229 -0.304**
0.173 0.165 0.148
R-squared 0.9732 0.9641 0.9822 0.9836 0.9831 0.9909
All prices in 2004 dollars. Signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. Robust standard
errors listed below the estimated coecients.
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Table 8: State-Specic Marginal Eects of Environmental Stringency
SHFO LHFO LHFO
Output (log) Output (log) Numbers (log)
Illinois 0.085** -0.138* -0.133***
0.044 0.081 0.047
Indiana 0.504*** -0.798*** -0.821***
0.053 0.239 0.187
Kansas 0.213*** -0.090 -0.081
0.031 0.103 0.059
Minnesota 0.885*** 0.836*** 0.690***
0.249 0.189 0.163
Missouri -1.071*** -1.059*** 0.113***
0.333 0.336 0.026
Nebraska -0.025 -0.482*** -0.443***
0.058 0.130 0.086
N. Carolina 0.038 -0.160* -0.113**
0.050 0.087 0.047
Ohio 0.731*** -0.008 0.471***
0.107 0.083 0.053
Oklahoma 0.634*** 0.111* -0.105*
0.060 0.065 0.057
Chi-squared value 2.889* 2.889* 1.111
Marginal Eects are calculated from the second regression with interaction terms. Environ-
mental stringency is measured as the log of the index value. Signicance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.1 levels denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. Robust standard errors listed below
the estimated coecients.
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Figure 1: Dierent Types of Size Bias due to Regulation
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Figure 2: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Values for Environmental Stringency
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Notes
1See http://www.nass.usda.gov/ for historical information on livestock inventory and
operations.
2Eutrophication is a process whereby water bodies receive excess nutrients (nitrogen and
phosphates) that stimulate excessive plant growth (e.g. algae). This enhanced plant growth
reduces dissolved oxygen in the water when dead plant material decomposes and can cause
other organisms to die.
3Our account of the background of the CWA in this paper draws from the EPA (2008,
pp. 70419-70422).
4The size thresholds specic to hogs are as follows. For operations with animals weighing
over 55 pounds, the size thresholds for small, medium, and large CAFOs are less than 750,
between 750 and 2,499, and 2,500 or more, respectively. For hog operations with animals
weighing less than 55 pounds, the corresponding size thresholds are less than 3,000, between
3,000 and 9,999, and 10,000 or more, respectively.
5In the case of new technology adoption both marginal-and average cost curves shift down
leading to reduction in price and an increase in output.
6Figure (1a) assumes that regulation shifts marginal and average cost curves upward in
the same manner as a neutral technological change induces a downward shift.
7Key and McBride (2007) provide an excellent review of changes in the hog industry
during the 1990s and 2000s.
8Available at http://www.nass.usda.gov.
9Available at http://www.eia.gov
10We recognize that due to the Waterkeeper Alliance court case many of the states de-
layed implementation of the 2003 regulation until much later, thus, some of the 2003-2006
environmental stringency levels may be overestimated. To test if this fact has an eect on
the results we ran the same econometric models on the pre-2003 data and found very similar
results. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
11We follow the same methodology as Levinson (2001) in determining a state-level LCV
score and we average the Senate and House of Representatives score for a particular state.
12Using the two highest producing adjacent states required us to create indices for four
states that are not in the top-ten (Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Virginia).
North Carolina is geographically isolated from the other top-ten producing states and two of
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the other states only have one adjacent state in the top-ten. Metcalfe (2000) included indices
for the earlier periods for these states. We updated these using the same methodology as
the other states.
13As with the state indicator variables, Iowa is omitted since it has the highest value of
production.
14One exception is Sneeringer and Key (2011).
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